Why "Good Governance" Alone Won't Stop Coups

The answer isn't as straghtforward as you think

At a recent civic seminar, a presenter asked an important question: Why is democracy declining in Africa? The answer from attendees was that the people were not getting the dividends of democracy. This answer was accepted by the presenter, and he went on to make a long speech about how delivering on the promise of democracy stops coups. It was a good speech, but it was wrong.

It's a mistake to think African democracies are failing just because their governments aren't providing enough benefits to the common man. Even if these democracies were successful in delivering for their people, military takeovers would still happen.

To understand my position, we need to take a look at some of the coups that have occurred in Africa in the last ten years. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have all experienced coups in the last decade. If our presenter is correct, we should be able to link the causes of these coups and continued military government to the democratic government not delivering on the promises of democracy. We won’t be able to do it, as I’ll show.

Mali

Mali is the perfect example for democrats. In 2020, a large pro-democracy protest movement by the people set the pretext that allowed army men to take over the government. For most, this explanation fits nicely into our constructed world. If the people don’t get credible elections (which is one of the dividends of democracy), they will protest, and that protest will lead to a coup. Therefore, credible elections are a way out of coups. You could tie up the position with a bow and deliver it as a present. It is neat, tidy, beautiful. It is also a lie.

It is true that the elections organized by President Ibrahim Keïta were characteristically African; that is to say, they were a sham. What is also true is that the demonstrations against Keïta were engineered by friend-now-turned-enemy Mahmoud Dicko. Dicko had supported Keïta early in his career but turned against him in 2017. That was only one leg of the problem.

The Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali and the proliferation of Islamists (who are Malians, of course) meant that the government, at the time of Keïta’s removal, controlled only one-third of the country. So Keïta was faced with A) his own obsession with power, B) a determined civil opponent who was connected with Islamist-leaning elements, and C) control of only about a third of his country. This was the pot of soup that he was forced to eat alone. In the end, it was mutinying leaders who solved the problem through force and established themselves.

Despite many promises to return to civilian government, the leader of the coup, Assimi Goïta, has sat still, and things are even worse for Mali now. The Islamists have consolidated their control, and the government controls even smaller territory than it did before the coup.

If horrible circumstances, caused by the government, are the reason for coups, why hasn’t a counter-coup happened yet? Or are the people not yet disillusioned with democracy, as they say in civic spaces? But Mali is one of the better examples for the democrat, as it at least includes some popular demonstrations. Let’s look at Niger.

Niger

On the morning of July 26, 2023, Abdourahmane Tiani, head of Niger’s Presidential Guard, and 350 of its members took President Mohamed Bazoum hostage at the presidential palace. What first looked like a mutiny soon snowballed into a complete coup that ended with Tiani as leader of the government.

While announcing the coup, Tiani and his men argued that they took power to correct the government’s anti-insurgency strategy. But that was far from the truth. In the weeks before, Bazoum had fallen out with Tiani over his accounting of funds available to the presidential guard. There were also rumors about Tiani getting replaced. The coup itself was somewhat unpopular; on the evening of the 26th, several hundred protesters took to the streets to demonstrate against Tiani. But it was too late. The die was cast, and Tiani assumed power.

Since then, things have predictably gotten worse for Niger. Recently, the government had to smuggle tankers of fuel into the country to mitigate an energy crisis caused by sanctions imposed by member states. If the prevailing theory about coups is correct, this state of affairs should lead to even further disillusionment of the people against the military. But that is yet to happen.

Burkina Faso

In a recent article, I explored the new Pan-African Maradona, His Excellency Captain Ibrahim Traoré, a coup leader and president who also happens to have seen one too many action movies.

Traoré came to power through a counter-coup against Damiba, and Damiba, who lasted barely a year as leader, came in through a coup against Kaboré in 2022. The reason the military gave for this coup was the worsening security situation in the country. While the coup took place during anti-government protests, the leadership of the military had been planning the coup itself since 2021. The demonstrations were merely an excuse for them to strike while the iron was hot.

As predicted, the security situation, now in the hands of the ever-able, never-failing Captain Fantastic Traoré, has worsened. Burkina Faso now controls around 40% of its own territory. Despite this, Pan-African admiration for Traoré has grown for two major reasons. First, he kicked the French out of the country. And secondly, he built not one but two tomato processing plants that employ a grand total of 180 people.

This state of affairs has not worsened public perception toward the military government. In fact, if YouTubers Wodo Maya and Tayo Aina are to be believed, the people now love Traoré even more. Perhaps they are now truly enjoying the dividends of democracy?

Coups Are Not Caused By Bad Government (Alone)

From these examples, it is clear that coups (in the last ten years at least) are not usually a spontaneous effect of public dissent. All the coups explored here were driven by groups with significant personal interests at heart, with many using popular demonstrations against democratic governments as a convenient excuse. These groups and their interests didn’t emerge out of the ether summoned by bad government.

Importantly, there is no evidence that these coups wouldn’t happen even if the government were delivering on all its promises. No matter how well governments do, there is always an opportunity to do better, even in developed nations. These opportunities will always be used as a pretext for military men to strike and seize power.

Nigeria, for example, has seen progressively worse outcomes since at least 2014. Recent troubling figures include wartime inflation, worsening security issues, and an exchange rate crisis that has impoverished the nation. Even the elections, despite being better run, are still largely a sham, and the public now routinely sits them out. In the last elections, more than 70% of the electorate did not vote. The people are clearly discontent, yet there have been no coups, despite the country having a long history of coups in the late 20th century.

It follows that nations that suffer coups also suffer from a unique tapestry of political networks that make the nation uniquely vulnerable to coups. Ergo, the key to solving the problem of military takeovers in West Africa isn’t the oft-repeated diet of “good governance” and “credible elections.” Instead, it is the hard and uncomfortable work of figuring out political solutions—which must include total institutional overhaul—and applying those solutions contextually to each state.

So next time you are in a seminar listening to a beautiful speech about how good governance is the key to strengthening democracy, remember that it may not even be half true. Especially in the West African context.